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**THE FIRST STEP TO DEVELOPING A UNITED  
NATIONS' RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY**

BY

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THE FIRST STEP TO DEVELOPING A UNITED NATIONS' RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY

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## ABSTRACT

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In order for the United Nations to establish the foundation for a rapid reaction capability it must enhance its political decision making process and strategic planning ability. Essential to achieving these goals is a robust inter-agency process with a political-military organization; capable of developing strategic level advice and planning suitable for input into the Security Council's decision making process. Fundamental to achieving this political-military machinery is the establishment of an United Nations' Military Staff Branch. This paper makes recommendations on how to quickly establish an appropriate organization that would be acceptable to member states of the United Nations.

"The first lesson is that International Military intervention in support of human values should be timely and robust or shunned altogether." Thomas.G. Weiss.<sup>1</sup>

## **Introduction**

Fifty years ago the United Nations (UN) was established. The founding fathers envisaged its task as "establishing a postwar order that would secure the peace, advance global prosperity, alleviate poverty and unemployment, and promote human rights worldwide."<sup>2</sup> During the following fifty years the Cold War dominated world events. Since the end of the Cold War the UN has become far more involved in the conduct of peace support operations, "a UN invention that has become its most prominent activity."<sup>3</sup>

In 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali released his report "An Agenda for Peace." The report responded to Heads of State and Government desires for exploring a more robust use of the Security Council now that the Cold War was over. However, after three years experience the Secretary-General released "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace 1995" that tempered these initial desires. Considerable criticism has been levelled at the UN for perceived failure with recent peace support operations, namely Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. Confidence in the UN ability to undertake peace support operations is at stake. Financial support to the UN from countries, such as the United States, will continue to be in doubt if serious attempts to improve and reform UN peace support operations are not undertaken quickly.

One lesson learnt during recent UN peace support operations is the need to respond rapidly to a crisis. "Rapid deployment of

forces is critical to a mission's success, in part because it is the key to gaining the support of the local population."<sup>4</sup> A recently issued Canadian Government Report "Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations" outlines the generic components necessary for a rapid reaction capability and provides several recommendations.

Janet Heininger in her book "Peace Keeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia" reminds all not to forget Clausewitz's maxim about the relationship between political and military objectives:

"Political objectives should be set first. They determine military objectives, which in turn determine the military tactics. All too often in recent missions, the political aims have been unclear or unattainable by application of force."<sup>5</sup>

Both Janet Heininger's reminder and the Canadian Government Report show a need for prompt action to improve elements of the Secretariat's strategic planning capability if it is to react quickly to a crisis. Sound strategic planning is axiomatic for the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council, as a basis for their decision making process, corporate political-military advice and recommendations that have received rigorous analysis. To meet these advice and planning requirements, the UN Secretariat needs an institutionalized political-military organization that:

"... enables military advice to be incorporated into the political decision making process, translation of political objectives into military missions and the maintenance and exercise of political control over military activity."<sup>6</sup>

Some may argue that those Security Council members receiving

military advice from their UN missions are an adequate method of meeting the needs of a political-military organization. This could not be further from the truth as the advice is not corporate nor available to all council members. Without such strategic advice institutionalized within the Secretariat, resolutions formulated by the Security Council will continue to lack the integration of the political-military advice needed for successful peace support operations.<sup>7</sup>

It is contended that the UN Secretariat does not possess an appropriate, institutionalized political-military organization. It is also contended that a Military Staff Branch, within the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), is fundamental to the continuing development of a credible UN rapid reaction capability. Without a competent political-military process to undertake strategic planning and advice, future peace support operations involving military forces will continue to be condemned to delays in implementation and unsuccessful outcomes.

The aim of this paper is to outline several recommendations to enhance the UN Secretariat's ability to provide the Security Council, as part of its decision making process, corporate political-military advice and recommendations that have undergone rigorous analysis, and an ability to translate political objectives into achievable military missions. For simplicity throughout this paper, the term peace support operations cover peace keeping, peace making, preventive deployment and peace enforcement operations, and those between.

### **What Rapid Reaction Requires**

The United Nations response to the Rwanda crisis was a stark example of the need for a rapid reaction capability. Although a peace agreement had been achieved by the belligerents, it took several months for the Security Council to authorize the United Nations Mission for Rwanda.

The recently released Canadian Government report on a UN rapid reaction capability identifies measures needed at four levels of the UN if it is to possess a rapid reaction capability. Two of these measures are fundamental to the contention of this paper. They are specifically:

"enhancing the effectiveness of the decision making process in political councils of the UN; and  
strengthening the UN Secretariat's capacity to conduct comprehensive, strategic planning in advance of a crisis."<sup>8</sup>

Fundamental to achieving these two goals is a robust institutionalized UN inter-agency process.<sup>9</sup>

### **Role and Structure of the UN, the Security Council and the Secretary General**

The purpose of the UN is to "maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations and achieve co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian charter."<sup>10</sup> To achieve these goals principle organs were established, a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a

Secretariat.<sup>11</sup> Over the years other organs, operations, specialized agencies and other autonomous organizations have developed. The system has become "not a single co-ordinated structure" but a labyrinth of many autonomous operating agencies, "with no master plan, over which the Secretary-General has nominal authority but little operational control."<sup>12</sup>

"The UN currently faces a daunting task in organizing and managing peace support operations at a time when demands have never been higher. It is widely recognized that the UN is, as a result, badly overstretched and that its organizational structures and systems, resources and procedures are no longer adequate to meet the demands of the increased number, size and complexity of such operations."<sup>13</sup>

The Secretary-General is the Chief Administrative Officer in the UN.<sup>14</sup> He is not the leader of a world government. His Secretariat comprises as much staff as the UN may require.<sup>15</sup> Several individuals, with UN experience, argue that taken together the root cause of UN failures (or potential failures) in such operations as Somalia, Rwanda and Yugoslavia are due to the overburdening and perpetuation of ad hoc procedures within the Secretariat and the Security Council; the secretive nature of the Secretariat and the Security Council's decision making process; and more important, the reliance on unsystematic, and often superficial, analyses of international problems.<sup>16</sup> Also, the practice of the UN using ad hoc procedures provide "too many possibilities for buck passing, not only within the organization, but more importantly between member states and the UN."<sup>17</sup>

Although the UN is not a world government, its activities have grown such that the Secretariat performs many of the

"customary activities of a government."<sup>18</sup> It carries out government type functions that require an institutionalized inter-agency process similar to those established in most developed countries. In 1992, the Secretary-General admitted that the Administrative Committee on Coordination, the highest body bringing together the executive heads of all specialized agencies and organizations of the UN system, needs to be more definitive with its guidance and co-ordination of agencies work.<sup>19</sup> However, major powers with "well-established political-military institutions already in place have little incentive to see the UN develop its own."<sup>20</sup> The major powers cannot have it both ways. The United States, for example, seeks as a matter of policy to improve the UN capacity to undertake peace support operations.<sup>21</sup> If the UN is to have the capacity to respond rapidly it must have an inter-agency organization incorporating an institutionalized political-military planning process. This process demands established committees and working groups with clear roles and tasks, focused on the principle of responsibility with accountability.

The Security Council is the central focus for all UN peace support operations. It is charged by the UN Charter with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>22</sup> Many member states believe the Security Council has been acting without an appreciation for the implications of its decisions or where and if the resources to carry them out are available.<sup>23</sup> Member states are now cautious about any future

operations, and the Security Council has not only been forced "to be more selective about involvement in crisis, but also develop criteria for selectivity."<sup>24</sup> The Security Council issued such selection criteria as a President of the Security Council Statement in May 1994.<sup>25</sup> As part of its decision making process, it receives reports and recommendations from the Secretariat; these reports and recommendations need to be subjected to rigorous political-military analysis before presentation to the Council. These reports and advice are fundamental to the Security Council issuing mandates with credible goals, end states and financial guidelines. Currently no robust strategic level inter-agency process to carry out any rigorous political-military analysis exists in the Secretariat.<sup>26</sup>

#### **Decision Process for Peace Support Operations**

The UN Charter lays down several ways through which any dispute, or any situation that might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, is brought before the UN for investigation and resolution. Generally they can be brought forward for consideration by member states, non-member states, the General Assembly, the Security Council or the Secretary-General. However, the significant aspect of these procedures is that any action to resolve a situation is entirely up to the Security Council.

There are two main methods in which the Security Council receives strategic advice and recommendations on international peace and security matters: the Secretary-General's Report and

Council Member's national sources. Arguably advice or recommendations from neither method is corporate, nor has it received the rigorous analysis necessary to ensure that the Security Council actions best address the underlying cause of conflict. The Secretary-General's Reports often are put together rapidly, and at times amended by various department heads without further interdepartmental consultation. Council members rarely share their national strategic analysis for many and valid reasons. Neither of these procedures is professional nor develops confidence that the solutions adopted by the Security Council will correctly address the conflict.<sup>27</sup> It is unlikely that the current methods by which the Security Council receives advice and recommendations will change rapidly, if ever.

To enable the Council to have a credible and legitimate decision making process, especially when military forces are involved, requires that advice and recommendations it receives from the Secretary-General have undergone rigorous political-military analysis. This is even more important given the need for the UN to be selective in what operations it undertakes; its decisions need to be seen as "legitimate and procedurally fair."<sup>28</sup> Fundamental to achieving these sound decisions is an institutionalized "political-military machinery, to assist in the framing of resolutions under Chapter VI or VII and to manage any military aspects of their implementation and control."<sup>29</sup> Only when possessing a political-military structure, containing an accepted and legitimate institutionalized strategic planning

process can, the UN be accredited as able to plan and conduct peace support operations credibly.

The UN Charter, Article 45 to 47, intended that a Military Staff Committee (MSC) would assist the Security Council in the making of plans for the application of armed force. In practice this has not worked and, given the composition of the MSC, it is doubtful that many member states would agree to its reactivation. There is the belief that "the MSC is dead because of the negative connotations it revives and the perceived threat it poses to the sanctity of sovereignty."<sup>30</sup> Because of the moribund nature of the MSC, "UN military mission analysis and planning have unavoidably devolved to the Secretariat through the Secretary-General."<sup>31</sup>

This situation will not change rapidly making it essential that the Secretariat can carry out military functions, similar to those the founding fathers envisaged the MSC would undertake, as part of its political-military organization. Currently, the Secretariat is not robust, structured or staffed to undertake this function. Until it is able to perform this function, the Security Council decision making process for peace support operations will lack credibility, legitimacy and not enhance the development of a rapid reaction capability.

#### **Crux to Establishing a Political-Military Organization**

The crux to the Secretariat's problem of not possessing an effective political-military organization is its lack of an institutionalized inter-agency planning process, an adequate strategic planning capability and a Military Staff Branch. Each

reduces the Secretariat's ability to provide the Security Council consistent, corporate strategic advice that has undergone rigorous political-military analysis. They also perpetuate the UN practice of ad hoc training and recruitment of its military staff.

Change at the UN needs to be accepted by the UN membership and, if possible, not require change to the UN Charter, conflict with political reality or be costly to implement.

#### **Planning UN Peace Operations:Inter-Agency**

An institutionalized planning process is one that undertakes a systematic approach, is simple, well documented, and staffs trained at all levels and undergo further training as their responsibilities increase. A planning process of these qualities is axiomatic for the Secretariat to develop advice and recommendations that have undergone rigorous analysis as part of the Security Councils decision making process. It is also essential for effective planning that a lead agency is nominated early and the establishment, composition and responsibilities of committees and working parties are documented and understood.

Responsibilities for effecting decisions need documenting and disseminated with follow up procedures to ensure that they are carried out. It is important that an established process is followed to ensure that amendments are not made to fundamental planning data or planning decisions without interdepartmental consultation. Planning should be able to be undertaken using either a deliberate or crisis action planning process. Also

planning or co-ordination at desk officer level should not occur without clear strategic objectives and financial guidance.

With the increased number and complexity of peace support operations, the Cold War approach of using a small UN civil staff to "deal with the military aspects of pre-deployment planning and task assessment" will not work.<sup>32</sup> Currently three principal departments are intimately involved in undertaking peace support operations. They are the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO). To a degree all departments conduct some form of strategic planning, albeit "the approach is far from co-ordinated."<sup>33</sup> Recently co-ordination procedures for these agencies in planning and implementing complex operations in the field were issued in draft form on 7 June 1995.<sup>34</sup> In reality it is only a flow chart that has not at this stage received acceptance by all departments.<sup>35</sup> However, the co-ordination sequences outlined are comprehensive and logical. The draft document clearly shows the need for considerable interdepartmental co-ordination and co-operation at all levels.

Unfortunately, it does not clearly outline any committees, working group structures, responsibilities or how actions are promulgated or followed up. Also at no stage is it clear where strategic military input enters the political decision making process. Although requested from UN sources no other doctrine or documentation covering an inter-agency strategic planning process was found during research for this paper.<sup>36</sup> Clearly the

Secretariat does not have a robust political-military organization and therefore in all probability undertakes strategic level planning in an ad hoc manner.


Because of the Secretariat's secretive nature it is not clear how successful the implementation of this draft initiative has been. However, the draft document is a vital start, but dependant on your position within the organization it is fair to comment that there is little institutionalized strategic level planning and what there is has a considerable way to go.<sup>37</sup>

During 1995 a middle management level Interdepartmental Oversight Group was established.<sup>38</sup> It sits weekly with two representatives each from DPKO, DHA and DPA.<sup>39</sup> Its intent is to discuss potential crises and report any concerns to their department heads. It is an important start at the working level to develop an inter-agency process, but "it is informal, relying on goodwill rather than approved formal mechanisms. Discussion is indecisive with little formal actions or outcomes and it does not appear to have top cover."<sup>40</sup> However all endeavours to continue with this initiative should be strongly supported as it is an essential start to establishing a political-military organization within the Secretariat.

#### **Planning UN Peace Operations:DPKO**

Within the Secretariat, DPKO is tasked with the prime responsibility for UN peace support operations. An Under-Secretary-General heads DPKO. It is organized functionally to run current operations, and planning and support. See Figure 1. Each

of these offices is headed by an Assistant-Secretary-General. The Military Adviser resides within the DPKO structure; he also currently heads the planning division within the Office of Planning and Support. Because he is located in DPKO he works for the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Keeping Operations, not the Secretary General. This promotes a situation where the Secretary-General does not have an established rapport with a Military Adviser and therefore probably receives ad hoc military advice.<sup>41</sup>



**Figure 1**

Within Planning Division is the Mission Planning Service,

Civil Police Unit, Demining Unit and the Training Unit. Also within the Office of Planning and Support is the Field Operations and Logistics Division to eliminate the separation of command and administration authority of operations in the field. Other DPKO elements are the Situation Centre and the Policy and Analysis Unit. For DPKO to respond rapidly to peace support operations considerable strategic planning and co-ordination within DPKO departments, divisions and units is necessary. Clearly an institutionalized planning process and staff trained in established procedures is fundamental to DPKO "modus operandi" if it is to be credible and legitimate to peace support operations.

DPKO is developing a standardized approach to the management of peace keeping missions.<sup>42</sup> One recommendation is that "...these standard planning procedures should incorporate a critical path analysis approach."<sup>43</sup> During October 1995 "General Guidelines for Peace Keeping Operations"<sup>44</sup> were issued. It provides a very general overview and does not show how DPKO fits into the Secretariat planning cycle. Nor does it provide guidance on how DPKO undertakes internal planning and coordination, or mention responsibilities or an established staff process. Work needs to continue in developing the doctrine for an institutionalized planning approach within DPKO.

#### **UN Military Staff**

Highlighted throughout this paper is the UN lack of an effective political-military structure. UN peace support operations need a structure within the UN Headquarters to provide

"the institutional gearing between the Security Council's strategic deliberations and the essentially national military process carried out on behalf of the UN at the operational and tactical levels."<sup>45</sup> The Security Council needs to "retain political control of the peace support operations it mandates without adversely affecting the operational autonomy of the national military forces conducting them."<sup>46</sup> There have been several proposals to establish a political-military machinery. Most proposals include the MSC reinstated in some form or another. Clearly any proposal that demands or relies on reactivation of the MSC will not gain acceptance quickly, if at all. Establishing, a Military Staff Branch within DPKO overcomes the concerns of reactivating the MSC and organ proliferation. It provides a benign and efficient method for the input of competent strategic level military advice and recommendations into the political decision making process.

Currently DPKO, other than the Military Adviser and his small staff, has no organic military staff structure. The Military Adviser is double hatted as the head of the Planning Division within the Office of Planning and Support. Placing the Military Adviser within DPKO and double hatting him within the Planning Division, although a valuable start, does not establish a credible and legitimate political-military organization. Although he has a Brigadier General Deputy, his current role and size of his staff preclude him from functioning effectively in any institutionalized strategic planning process necessary of a

true political-military organization.<sup>47</sup> The litmus test in establishing a Military Staff Branch is its ability to undertake strategic planning and develop quality input into the political decision making process; translate political objectives into credible military missions and develop military command and control aspects.

To minimize UN organizational changes the Military Adviser should head an independent Military Staff Branch within DPKO. He should be accredited at Assistant-Secretary-General level and, although working for the head of DPKO, has an approved formal direct access to the Secretary-General. The Military Adviser must be an officer of "international reputation and sufficient stature to deal effectively with military and civil leaders at the UN and around the world."<sup>48</sup> The number of permanent members of his staff need not be extensive, but structured to undertake the functions of strategic advice and planning.

The Military Assistant, his deputy and the Chief of Staff should be permanent personnel positions. To minimize financial considerations the remainder should be appropriately qualified long term loan personnel from member states. Although most peace operations will involve a preponderance of ground forces the Staff should be a cross section of all services. It must be capable of operating as a joint forum. It would not be a "battle staff," but undertake all necessary planning functions required to be an integral part of the UN political decision making process.<sup>49</sup> It would also undertake the function of an interface

for initial and transition military planning between the strategic level (UN Headquarters) and the operational level (Force Commander).

Creation of a UN Military Staff Branch enhances the Secretariat's ability to concentrate on strategic aspects and the Force Commander on the operational and tactical aspects of an operation. This concentration of focus is important because concurrent operations make resource allocation a significant factor in the political decision making process. In addition concerns of military Force Commanders could be handled by the Military Staff Branch who would be conversant with the political climate and objectives. The branch would also possess the ability to influence decisions and outcomes.

Continuing the use of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the field eliminates the need for a "UN HQ Military Operations Centre" to control any field operations. However, there is a need to maintain situational awareness through routine monitoring of field operations. This function is carried out by the current UN Situation Centre.

There has been a recent attempt by Malaysia to have a formal mechanism or procedure for consultation between the Security Council and countries contributing troops to an operation.<sup>50</sup> A current procedure does exist for force contributing nations to consult the Security Council, albeit it is ad hoc and at the Council's pleasure. The Security Council has not acted to date on Malaysia's initiative. However, it is probable that the proposed

mechanism will receive little support or delayed for further consideration. The reasons for this are similar to those that impede extending the number of permanent Security Council members. A UN Military Staff Branch could enhance the ability of countries contributing troops to carry out initial liaison and strategic planning for an operation, and too input into the political decision making process.

General (Ret.) John Galvin, suggests the UN should "subcontract enforcement measures and provide only political and moral mandate."<sup>51</sup> If capable and acceptable subcontractors are available and prepared to be involved early in the planning process, this approach could develop as the format for all peace support operations where military forces are involved. "Once the lead country has agreed to take on the role, it might recruit others to join the operation, in conjunction with the UN."<sup>52</sup> This does not mean that the UN is "passing the buck." The UN, through the Security Council mandate, sets the political objectives and exercises political control. The UN Military Staff, exercising joint planning with the nominated force commander and his staff, develops the military mission. An approach along these lines was used by the United States in Haiti. The difference would be the UN, with a robust and capable planning staff could check the work of the subcontractor and raise problems to the political level in the Security Council. In Haiti, the UN had to essentially accept what its subcontractor did.

#### **DPKO Staff Training**

The UN Headquarters acts in a "fast moving, life threatening business and must be prepared to function properly" as a political-military organization from the start.<sup>53</sup> The UN ad hoc procedure of borrowing military personnel, "each time from different sources, each with their own modus operandi," does not enable it to function effectively.<sup>54</sup> There have been suggestions of establishing a UN Staff Corps, establishing a UN Staff College and developing stand by staff cadres.<sup>55</sup> One proposal would incorporate into the syllabi of national staff colleges the planning, preparation and execution of peace operations.<sup>56</sup>

All these proposals provide long term solutions and do not address the immediate problem caused by ad hoc recruiting. Because of political reality and financial reasons the current ad hoc procedure will continue. Also, these proposals incorporate major changes, something member states are not quick to endorse. However, for the UN credibility and legitimacy in peace support operations it needs to act now to ameliorate the effects caused by this ad hoc procedure.

Establishing a training standard bench mark for future military staff recruitment is a quick and simple action to address the problem. Clearly member nations will raise objections about the fairness of representation on the military staff. They must overcome their petty concerns and accept this procedure because these staff members must be competent when operating in a fluid environment dealing with life threatening situations. To show its credibility and legitimacy in peace support operations

the UN must immediately insist on a bench mark of training standards for its headquarters military staff. A plan to undertake this concept needs prompt attention and should include ways to help member states to qualify personnel. Although it will be difficult to select a staff training bench mark, the benefits of its selection and implementation, and the group esprit de corps gained are significant steps in the development of the UN rapid reaction capability.

#### **Staffing within DPKO**

Three years ago William Durch noted that member states understood "the UN secretariat ...needed substantial changes in staffing in order to handle its increasing number of peace support operations given to it by the Security Council."<sup>57</sup> Assessing UN operations from 1991-1994, Thomas Weiss concluded that "UN military professionalism has not kept pace with the increased demand for UN operations" and viewed the UN "capacity to plan peace support operations ...as not much greater now than during the Cold War."<sup>58</sup> Conversely a recent newsletter on the UN stated: "...with the Security Council extremely unlikely to venture soon into anything on the scale of Bosnia or Cambodia, there is little need to keep DPKO at the size it assumed in the last few years."<sup>59</sup> The newsletter fails to recognize that support staff reductions will be commensurate with any decrease in the number of peace support operations undertaken in the future.

There are four types of staff within DPKO. They are

permanent, support, temporary and loan staff. The permanent staff is as their name implies and paid from the UN operating budget. The support staff is funded and employed under contract on a ratio according to the number of current peace support operations. The temporary staff is a limited number of very short term employees. Loan staff is as their name implies and provided by member states at no cost to the UN. Within DPKO the percentage of staff breakups is permanent staff 12%, support staff 54%, temporary staff 9% and loan staff 25 %.<sup>60</sup> Clearly for DPKO to function it relies heavily on support and loan staff. This reliance significantly restricts its ability to undertake strategic planning, frame resolutions for Security Council consideration, develop policy, co-ordinate and support operations credibly and legitimately.

Compounding the problem is that permanent staff positions are not allocated to the areas most requiring stability. The Office of Planning and Support, responsible for activities such as mission planning, medical support, civilian police, demining and training units, has a permanent staff of 6%. However, in the Office of Operations 34% of its staff are permanent. Significant units that have no permanent staff are the Situation Centre, the Personnel Administration Unit, and the Logistic and Communication Service.<sup>61</sup> These and other critical units are headed by support, temporary or loan personnel. This ad hoc staff allocation may have developed due to the speed and increase of demands on DKPO. However, it is not an appropriate practice for ensuring that

built up corporate skills and knowledge is not lost, or that planning is undertaken in professionally. A need exists to reassess permanent staff positions in DPKO.

Pragmatically no additional funds will be made available to recruit further permanent military staff; and as the number of peace support operations vacillates, military personnel numbers to staff DPKO will continue to be a concern. Drastic measures may be needed to maintain adequate military staff through amalgamation of departments such as DPKO and DPA. However, relying on an increasing number of loan staffs , albeit not ideal, is a pragmatic and politically acceptable approach to take. This approach makes the need to establish a training benchmark for recruiting military staff even more important.

### **Conclusion**

Rwanda was a clear indication of the UN inability to respond to a crisis rapidly. Several studies and analysis have identified reasons for this lack of a rapid reaction ability. The most comprehensive is the Canadian Government Report "Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations." The report identifies elements fundamental to rapid reaction. Two of these elements are the basis for the recommendations of this paper. They are the need to enhance the UN political decision making process and strengthening the Secretariat's capacity to undertake strategic planning. Fundamental to an effective political decision making process is an institutionalized political-military machinery. This machinery enables military advice to be

incorporated into the political decision making process, translates political objectives into credible military missions and maintains and exercises political control over military activities.<sup>62</sup>

This paper has made several recommendations on how to quickly establish a functional political-military machinery that will be politically acceptable to most member states.

Fundamental to achieving this political-military mechanism is the input of good strategic level military advice to the political decision making process. The MSC is moribund and thereby ineffective. By default the task to provide this military advice has fallen to the Secretary-General and his Secretariat. The Secretariat does not possess a credible or legitimate functional political-military organization because it lacks a military staff focused on providing strategic level advice and planning. To compound this problem is the Secretariat's lack of a robust inter-agency strategic planning process for its departments involved in peace support operations. Compounding this problem further is the ad hoc process for military staff recruitment and placement. To overcome these problems an inter-agency planning process is required in the Secretariat. The organization must include a Military Staff Branch, an institutionalized strategic planning process, and bench mark training standards and established staff recruitment procedures. A functional political-military organization will ensure the input of good military advice into the Security Council's

decision making process. It is the first important step in the development of a UN rapid reaction capability.

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